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Justice in the Slough of Equality
By Jumus STONE*
I. Introduction
The notion of equality is basic at least to mathematical calcu-
lation and syllogistic argument; it may also be basic in other areas
of thought and discourse. It is commonly assumed that equality
is a basic notion of justice; if not, indeed, the whole final meaning
of justice. We seem to think that all issues of justice can be re-
solved by reference to one modality or other of equality and that,
if an issue cannot be so resolved, it is because we have overlooked,
or failed to invent, the appropriate modality of equality.
This Article will examine a modest version of the notion that
equality is basic to justice, the "presumption of equality," which is
the presumption that equality is justice. This idea, with diverse
shadings, has been persistently offered by a wide and distinguished
philosophers' consensus.
Justice has been a central concern in western social thought for
more than two millennia, three millennia if the Hebrew as well as
the Greek tradition is considered. This concern for justice has been
a search for principles, guidelines or criteria for human conduct in
society and has had particular regard for the allocation of scarce re-
sources and personal attributes and the sharing of social burdens.
With occasional and transient exceptions,1 the mainstream of
thought about justice from the Hebrew prophets and Greek philoso-
phers onward has been in the context of municipal societies, of the
internal arrangement of states as we now know them. The rise of
* O.B.E., B.C.L., D.C.L. (Oxford), LL.D., honoris causa (Leeds), S.J.D. (Har-
vard). Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence and International Law, Hastings Col-
lege of the Law.
1. Probably the best example of such an exception in past centuries was the
problematical doctrine of "the just war."
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the modern system of nation states, since at least the 16th century,
has surrounded issues of justice in municipal societies with new per-
plexities, but it is also true that these issues have become afflicted
with perplexities quite apart from their international aspects.
Skeptics about justice as a serious human concern can point not
only to the obviously imperfect practices of even the most admired
municipal societies but also the no less obvious chaos of conflicting
principles and criteria offered by serious thinkers. Does this, then,
dispose of the need for further concern with justice by thoughtful
people? I think not. Our failures thus far need not mean that the
search is in vain. It may only mean that the problems of justice
are endless and that therefore the search, too, is also endless. Major
changes in society and its environment stir people to reexamine
their values and theories about them, among which justice and its
criteria rank high. If these values and theories now seem in chaos
and conflict, this may be a reflection of the unprecedented rate of
change in contemporary society. Future shock bears down on our
concern with justice as much as on other aspects of our lives.
In such an age, absolute criteria of justice are the first to jade.
As rates of change increase, the past efforts to give justice a core
meaning for all times and places and the even more contemporary
efforts to define "the sense of justice" look antiquated. However,
the competing relativist reliance on adaptation to conditions of time
and place does not prove fruitful either. In a time when too much
is too long in too headlong change, untempered relativism becomes
a helter-skelter in which humans do not judge but await outcomes
as declared by Judge Time.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the last two dec-
ades have seen a plethora of efforts to accommodate the rapid shifts
and deep intractabilities of concern for justice by appealing to for-
mulas of vast generality. The indeterminacy of some general for-
mulas, as with Rawls' "fairness," 2 is apparent, however valiantly its
advocates pretend to defend it by appealing for intuitive acceptance
of specific examples or drawing notional veils of ignorance. Formulas
centered on equality, however, appear to stand in a different position.
First, theories of justice based on equality carry at least a soupgon
of mathematical or syllogistic demonstrability. They are attractive
2. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 108-14, 136-42, 333-50 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as RAWLS].
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to the one kind of faith which commands a degree of general accept-
ance even today, the faith in exact science. Second, partially be-
cause of its kinship to mathematics, equality seems to have a definite
meaning in a sense in which notions of fairness do not. Third, and
probably most important, advocates of equality as justice can point
to the idea's success in practice through the history, particularly the
recent history, of the Western world.
The appeal to the symbol of equality in some form or another
has been a formidable social and political weapon in landmark strug-
gles. A few of these victories may be recalled:
-the equality of all legales homines in England after Magna Carta;
-the equality of personal monarchs and their States (i.e., personal
domains) in Christendom after the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648;
-the 6galit6 (joined with the liberty and fraternity) of citizens pro-
claimed by the French Revolution;
-the equality of endowment by the Creator of all free Americans
with certain inalienable rights, proclaimed by the American Revolu-
tion;
-the legal emancipation and attempted grant of civil rights to the
southern blacks by the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment and the
early civil rights laws;
-the equality of comradeship of peasants and workers as seen in the
powerful mainstream of Marxist thought and their notional equality
of access to the means of production and the needs of life;
-the steady, if rather prolonged, pressure in industrialized countries
to equalize in various ways workmen's bargaining power vis-a-vis
employers, since the first industrial revolution;
-the successful struggle for the one-man-one-vote principle, as against
both arbitrary votelessness and plural voting;
-the related movement towards equal distribution of political power
through reapportionment of electoral boundaries;
-the struggle for equality in voting power of women and young
adults;
-the resumed struggle of American blacks, after World War II, to
achieve an actual equality that would give "reality" to their legal
equality. The symbolization of this as a "freedom struggle" is in part
a misnomer. Its central drive, as its targeting against discrimination
and segregation indicate, is towards a fuller actual equality.
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-the central drives for equality of status, privilege, function, and pay
of the "women's liberation" movements. As with the American
blacks, the present women's movements are often merely demanding
that women's legal equality on the level of the franchise, etc., be com-
pleted by access to fuller actual equality.
The multiplication of nation-states since World War II also mani-
fests similar struggles in the name of equality of peoples. Here, the
attainment of legal equality through liberation from old colonial em-
pires is an overture to continued struggles in the name of equality
towards the good life. These struggles have still to reach their ze-
nith, not only with respect to decisionmaking in international bodies
but also on the substantive issues of global distribution of resources
and power.
Many of the victories won by appeals to equality were parts of
the increasing pressures for the kind of governmental intervention
that now characterizes the welfare state in Western political democ-
racies. The legal grant of the franchise and equalization of worker-
employer bargaining power are expressions of a recognition that the
state has a duty to assure a minimum share of material endowment
to all members of society. From this recognition flow rising expec-
tations, not only for material minima but for minima of the mind
and spirit, for the quality of life in its fuller sense - "the good life."
It would be a mistake, though, to treat the tactical victories
which used equality as a battle cry, as a validation of the use of
equality as an adequate criterion of justice. As is suggested at the
end of Section IV, human entitlements to material and spiritual wel-
fare need a firmer and wider base than the notion that equality is
justice.
II. Pilgrimages to Equality - the New Mecca
In light of the pragmatic success of the idea of equality, one
can understand why distinguished theoreticians of justice have flocked
to it.
An idea to be successful (we tend to think) must be right.
What remains is but to work out its universal and permanent appli-
cations. Theories of justice have now become enmeshed in endless
explanations of justice-as-equality or equality-as-justice.
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These philosophical pilgrimages move through many familiar
landscapes. Above all they recall the journeyings of Immanuel Kant
but are often hindered in the modem versions by impedimenta alien
to Kantian concepts. Kant's statements on the relation of justice to
freedom and equality were, of course, varied.3  His law of innate
freedom requires each person to act, if he is to act justly, only ac-
cording to a maxim that can become a universal law or, alternatively,
that treats others only as ends in themselves and not as means to
his own ends. This law of innate freedom is also a law of equal free-
dom imposing itself on us a priori in any inquiry about justice. It is
compelling a priori. For since an inquiry about justice is one about
how a person ought to choose between alternative courses, it would be
a senseless inquiry unless each person was equally capable of exercising
free will in choosing. Kant's theory, then, is that inquiries about
justice by their very nature presuppose a community of free-willing
beings each choosing his course of action in a context of equally free
others.
The best known contemporary variations on this theme are in
Rawls' work on justice. 4  Rawls has substituted the "veil of ignor-
ance"5 for Kant's a priori argument and has limited the area in which
individuals are entitled to equal freedoms. Thus, Rawls hems in the
equal freedom of all by the rather sporting concept of "fairness" as
well as by the compassionate doctrine of improving the lot of the
least fortunate. This concern for the less fortunate, of course, assures
some legitimate breathing space for the welfare state. By accommo-
dating the discriminations unavoidable in welfare programs, Rawls
is at odds with the mainstream of egalitarian individualism proceed-
ing from Kant. Even ff he were to specify more clearly than he has
how the inequalities, that his theory could legitimate, would lead
vith certainty to the benefit of the least fortunate, he would, none-
theless, subject the presumption of equality to innumerable and in-
definite qualifications.
3. See J. STONE, Humr LAW AND HumAN JUSTICE 82-104 (1965).
4. See RAWLS, supra note 2.
5. Rawls' theory of justice demands that members of society be deemed to have
made an original agreement as to the principles of justice for the basic structure of
society from behind a "veil of ignorance." Among the essential features of this situa-
tion are that "no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor
does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelli-
gence and strength, and the like." BAWLs, supra note 2, at 137. All regulation of
society's institutions and individuals must then be in accord with the principles of justice
initially agreed upon. Id. at 11-17.
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The resulting contrast with such a classic of Kantian egalitarian
individualism as Hayek's Road to Serfdom 6 is startling. Hayek's
thought equips the Kantian themes with the armor and plumes of
entrepreneurial knighthood in resistance to totalitarianism, socialism,
or even welfare interventionism.
For the most part, however, those current scholars who treat
equality as a central element or constitutive principle of justice lack
the confidence to sustain such crusades. The more skeptical egali-
tarians, exemplified by Chaim Perelman, would seem to hold the
Kantian notion to the realm of "formal justice." Issues of "material"
justice, the issues about which men cry out, struggle, and even die,
are outside its control. Others, less cautious, struggle to defend the
role of equality as central to material justice. Their defense indulges
what D. E. Browne has termed "the presumption of equality";- and
any rebuttals of this presumption are also sought to be supported in
terms of various modalities of the same notion of equality. The re-
luctance of these thinkers to accept Perelman's cautious limitation of
Kantian applicability to "formal justice" is natural enough. For the
present writer, this reluctance arises from the very description of "for-
mal justice" as equality. For such a notion, lucid as it may be, seems
to pertain, not to the subject of "justice," but rather to logic or even
arithmetic. Indubitably a rule applies equally to all to whom it is ap-
plicable, and a designated class embraces all members who fall with-
in the designation of the class; one cannot challenge such assertions.
They are, however, prior to and in no way special to inquiries about
justice. It is only after they have been recognized and accepted
that the substantive questions of justice arise. I would hope that
Chaim Perelman would not quarrel with this final point; and that
that, finally, is the meaning of his emphatic separation of "formal
justice" from "material justice."8
III. Equality as Presupposing Empirical Inquiries
The more widespread views which D. E. Browne has usefully
termed "the presumption of equality" involve more complex if not
6. F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
7. Browne, The Presumption of Equality, 53 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHILOSOPHY (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Browne].
8. See C. PERELMAN, DE LA JUSTICE (1945); J. STONE, HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN
JUSTICE 325-30 (1965); J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINcS 325-37
(1964).
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more confusing issues. The grouping of vie_ s presented here is
intended only to indicate a concurrence of thought on the point and
not necessarily concurrence of argument or conclusion. 9 The par-
ticular point is acceptance of a normative principle that we should
treat all persons the same, or equally, until good reasons for treating
them differently, or unequally, are shown.
Used in this sense, the presumption of equality stands apart
from Aristotle's classical formula that equals should be treated equal-
ly and unequals unequally. Aristotle's formula leaves both propon-
ents of equality and the proponents of inequality to prove empirically
whether persons, among whom justice is to be done, have character-
istics entitling them to similar (equal) or different (unequal) treat-
ment. If we add to the Aristotelian starting point an empirical find-
ing that for the preponderance of persons or issues badges of entitle-
ment are equal, we would, thereby, be warranted in indulging the
presumption of equality in distribution. Insofar as the empirical
finding is correct (and, of course, the badges of entitlement empir-
ically found were the relevant ones, that is, normatively warranted
for the particular justice-problem) the presumption of equality would
be genuine and well-founded. 10 Conversely, if the empirical finding
was that the persons had characteristics justifying discrimination
(that is, they did not have in common the relevant badges of en-
titlement) the opposite presumption, that of inequality in distribu-
tion, might be warranted.
Can we indulge the presumption of equality without reference
to evidence drawn from empirical inquiries concerning the presence
or absence of discrimination-justifying characteristics in the badges
of entitlement? Is there any adequate nonempirical ground for re-
sort to such a presumption before making such empirical inquiries?
Three such a priori arguments have been suggested.
9. Browne, supra note 3; R. PETErs, Ermcs AND EDUCATION 71-91 (1966); Benn,
Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of Interests, in EQUALrTY 61 (J. Pennock and J.
W. Chapman eds. 1967). See generally S. BENN & R. PETrs, SOCIAL PINCIPLES AND
=H DEMOCRATIC STATE (1959); Bedau, Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality, in
EQuALrry 3 (J. Pennock and J.W. Chapman eds. 1967); Berlin, Equality, 56 PROC.
ArSTOTELIAN Soc. 301 (1956); Graham, Liberty and Equality, 74 MmD 59 (1965);
Lucas, Against Equality, 40 PHLOSOPHY 296 (1965).
10. Although I find it hazardous to call those who hold this genuine presumption
"egalitarians proper" as Browne proposes, I agree with the basic distinction that he is
struggling to make. I also agree that the test of genuineness would be the willingness
of proponents of this position to abandon the presumption if the empirical evidence
showed that differences (inequalities) in the badges of entitlement rather than their
similarities (equalities) were predominant. See Browne, supra note 7.
May 1978] 1001
First, without this presumption we would have to proceed on
the basis of contradictory propositions. That is, the a priori stand-
ing of Kant's free-willing individuals springs from the consideration
that, if we do not accept that individuals have free will, and yet
persist in inquiring about ethics and justice, we are simultaneously
denying that individuals are free to choose and yet entering into
an inquiry which presupposes that they are free to choose. And this
Kantian line could conceivably be pressed through from a priori
proof of free will of each, to proof of the free will of all and there-
fore to the equal free will of all, regardless of any empirical con-
sideration of time and place. The difficulty with this ground is that
most thinkers are concerned to escape, by the presumption of equal-
ity, the consequences of the individualist doctrine of the illimitable
free will to which the Kantian a priori proof has often tended.
A second argument that might support the presumption of equal-
ity without relying on prior empirical inquiries is to argue from the
common humanness11 of those among whom a just distribution is
to be made. As Browne points out, this argument begs the question,
in that it assumes without empirical inquiry that because humanness
is common to all members of society, it must be the central or at
least the most commonly found badge of entitlement, or character-
istic relevant to justice. The argument has a certain adventitious
strength because the positive affect surrounding the symbol of "com-
mon humanity" exposes those who deny the adequacy of this argu-
ment to charges of inhumanity. This exposure might be reduced
but is not wholly removed by substituting the word "humanness"
for "humanity." Yet it is critical to make this denial and to show
that it is not a sign of inhumanity, but rather an attempt to remove
a roadblock of thought which hampers performance of the tasks
of justice and perhaps even of those of human compassion.
The correct analysis recognizes that the common humanness of
people is undoubtedly a condition without which questions of human
justice cannot arise.'12  The delimitation of those persons sharing a
common humanness among whom justice is to be done defines what
may be termed the constituency of justice and is an essential pre-
liminary to decisions about justice. This defining is a necessary step
11. Intensified, of course, by religious ideals of "the brotherhood of man" and
"the Fatherhood of God."
12. This Article does not explore questions of justice between humans and other
species or between humans and their environment.
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toward raising questions of justice, but it cannot resolve these ques-
tions of whether persons shall be treated equally or unequally.13  In-
deed, insofar as we accept Aristotle's justice and equality formula
requiring equals to be treated equally and unequals unequally, we
would violate that formula by accepting the presumption of equality
as springing from the mere humanness of the persons involved.
In short, to disregard relevant differences is as unjust as it is
to regard irrelevant differences. To respect this truth, the relevance
of common humanness to justice must be limited to the basic claim
that all persons physically present within the constituency of justice
must be counted as within it for the purpose of justice. This prob-
lem of the relevance of common humanness to justice was a great
question for many ancient societies. Aristotle tried to sidestep the
problem of the slaves of Athens by stigmatising slaves as apparently
slaves by nature and thus not human despite appearances. It is still
an important question in many contemporary developing societies.
It is, however, certainly not central to the struggles for justice in
western democratic polities today, although, as was acknowledged
in Section I, the great historical victories of the equality symbol
have occurred in delimiting the constituency of persons among whom
a just distribution is to be sought.
A third argument for the presumption of equality as an axiom
of justice is that justice must be dispensed by rules, and that a rule
by its very nature must apply equally to all persons who fall within
it. However, it is also the nature of rules to discriminate between
those who fall within the rule and those who fall without it. Advo-
cates making the nature of a rule argument must perforce recognize
that justice requires inequalities corresponding to the different facts
predicated by the different rules. These differences, assuming the
rules to be just, correspond to the relevant differences between the
13. J.R. Lucas well observed that to derive an equality norm from the humanist
observation that "a man is a man for a' that," we would have to frame an argument
somewhat in the form:
"All men are men
All men are equally men
.*. All men are equal."
And he observes wittily that if we substituted "numbers" for "men" in this set,
we would have the obviously fallacious argument:
"All numbers are numbers
All numbers are equally numbers
'. All numbers are equal."
Lucas, Against Equality, 40 PmIosoPHY 297 (1965).
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badges of entitlement of those concerned. Yet as a badge of entitle-
ment, humanness is either there or it is not; it does not admit of the
differences in degree or kind which base the plurality of rules. To
put the matter another way, it is the tolerance of discriminations
corresponding to relevant differences which may render several dif-
ferent rules all just.
The failure of the above three arguments does not exclude the
possibility that a successful a priori demonstration of the presump-
tion of equality of entitlement among all the members of any justice
constituency may yet be made. What can be said is that such a
demonstration has not yet emerged and without it only the empirical
study of factual differences, relevant in the light of normative prin-
ciples about what factual differences are relevant to justice, can tell
us whether to presume that just distribution should be equal or un-
equal. It may well be, indeed, that no presumption whatsoever is
warranted. This would be the result if the empirical data were in-
conclusive as to whether there is a preponderance of persons or is-
sues showing relevant differences, either because findings were in-
adequate or random, or because we cannot agree on what differences
should be considered relevant to justice.
After accepting the necessity for empirical grounds, but suffer-
ing the absence of empirical data, we may indulge in the presump-
tion of equality because we guess that differences justifying unequal
entitlements are rarer than similarities calling for equal entitlements.
This guess could be a well-founded egalitarian position, but only if
those who embrace it are ever willing to change the presumption in
light of new empirical evidence. Whenever it was shown that the
incidence of relevant empirical differences demanding unequal treat-
ment was predominant over the relevant similarities calling for equal
treatment, the presumption of equality would have to be abandoned.
Failure to accept this proposition, as Browne well observes, is to be
"blinded by the imaginary glare of Egalit6.' '1
IV. Equivocations of Equality
The blinding effect of 6galitg is made all the more perilous by
the treacherous ambiguities and contradictions concealed beneath
this encompassing symbol. I have examined elsewhere the extra-
14. Browne, supra note 7, at 52.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
JUSTICE IN THE SLOUGH OF EQUALITY
ordinary range of equivocations carried by the doctrine of equality
of States in the history of international law.' 5 The equivocations
carried by the equality symbol in municipal systems are almost as
luxuriant.
There is, first, the thesis that since all claimants to justice share
a common humanness, the fact that humanness is thus common means
that all who share it must be treated as equal, until good reason to
the contrary is shown. The extraordinary practical success of this
argument in historical attacks on the grossest injustices, such as slav-
ery, has already been conceded and explained. What this meaning
of equality really does is to revise (or restipulate) the meaning of
"the society" among whose members justice is to be done. Its his-
torical success has been in challenging those gross forms of injustice
which amount to the exclusion of human beings from the community
among whose members a just distribution is to be made. Beyond
this point, however, I have also given reasons for agreeing with D. E.
Browne that the fact that a number of persons are all human "has
no tendency whatsoever to settle the question of what justice requires
in favour of treating them equally."16
A second meaning of the equality principle may be that the
same uniform rules should be applicable to all members of society,
conferring the same benefits and imposing the same burdens on each
person. In some of his less durable statements, Dicey proclaimed
this as the ideal of "the rule of law," recognized as a most important
British contribution to human progress. As a basic criterion of jus-
tice, however, this version of "the rule of law" has the following
grave defects:
(1) Equality in this sense is compatible with the grossest in-
justice towards persons physically present in the society but excluded
from membership in it, and thus from the benefits of "the rule of
law"; the slaves of Rome, Greece, and the pre-Civil War American
states are obvious examples.
(2) Even if all human beings are admitted to the constituency
15. See Stone, Approaches to the Notion of International Justice, in 1 THE FuTunE
OF THE INERNATiONAL LEGAL ORDER 372-460 (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1969). More
general advertence to the role of these equivocations would add still more force at a
number of the points to J. R. Lucas' positions. See Lucas, supra note 9. See note 30
& accompanying text, infra.
16. Browne, supra note 7, at 50.
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of justice, the rules equally applicable to all may simply be rules that
are equally oppressive and outrageous to all.
(3) Even if all human beings are admitted to the constituency
of justice and the uniform rules are generally benevolent, application
of those rules to specific individuals may still be unjust. For ex-
ample, most people would agree that income taxes raised and spent
for the good of society would be unjust if they were assessed without
regard to whether the taxpayer is rich or poor. As Anatole France
put it in his famous aphorism: the rich equally with the poor would
be thus forbidden to sleep under the bridges of the Seine.
Third, equality may refer to a requirement that rules be uni-
formly applied not only to all members of the justice constituency,
but also to all persons physically present in a society. This mean-
ing of equality has the effect of including everyone in the justice
constituency and remedies defect (1) noted above, but it does not
solve the other two problems of rules equally oppressive toward all
and rules that fail to account for individual situations.
Fourth, rather than referring to a system of justice whose main
feature is uniformly applicable rules, equality may refer to a system
of equal sharing of scarce resources among all members of society,
bearing in mind factual inequalities among people both before and
after application of the law. In this system rules would meet the
criterion of equality not by their uniform application but by their
effectiveness in reducing inequalities that existed prior to applica-
tion of the rule. The increased equality would be achieved only
because the rule of law does not treat all members of society equally,
but actually discriminates in favor of those initially disadvantaged.
This fourth meaning of equality, which may be termed "residual
equality," is not only different from but is directly opposed to the
meaning of equality in the second and third senses discussed above,
and the solutions it produces will be correspondingly different.
Suppose, for example, that a legislature uninhibited by constitu-
tional restraints decided that equality is the principle of justice to be
applied to the problem of inflation. The purpose of the new law is
to index wages and prices to the rate of inflation. Advocates of
equality in its fourth meaning might well propose, as have the trade
unions in Australia and the United Kingdom, that in view of the
lesser affluence of workers as compared with employers, workers'
wages should be allowed to increase at the full rate of inflation while
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
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price increases should be held to only fifty percent of the rate of
inflation. This proposal would be in radical conflict with the other
meanings of equality. When equality is viewed as demanding the
uniform application of rules, all workers and employers must be gov-
erned by the same rate of indexing for both wages and prices.
The critical question of justice here is whether prices should be
allowed to increase at a rate that matches the inflation rate or at a
rate half that of inflation. To answer this question, we must resort
to criteria of justice other than equality. We might ask, for example,
whether the level of wages of workers is so low that inflation will
reduce their living conditions below what is needed for physical sub-
sistence, or whether it will only deprive them of expected new com-
forts like washing machines or extra automobiles. We might also
ask whether employers and merchants have capital reserves to tide
them over during an inflationary period, or whether their reserves
are near exhaustion. Answers to these questions may lead to differ-
ent rules for employers than for workers. Such a decision would be
doing justice on the basis of needs as determined by some decision-
maker.
Reality is, of course, more complicated than this example. Quite
apart from the problems of subjective determination of needs, need
is only one of the many values that bear on justice. There is also,
for example, the value of merit in relation to past economic perform-
ance; there is the value of human dignity in relation to the right to
work; there is the value of political effectiveness in relation to main-
taining conditions in which government can continue to govern;
there is the value of family and civic solidarity in relation to sharing
of sacrifices in the face of adversity; there is the value of power in
relation to the feasibility of maintaining the power of a democratic
electorate over those who exercise the public authority. Thus, once
it is settled that the constituency of human justice embraces all hu-
man beings, justice is the preeminent criterion in making a distribu-
tion among them, not the notion of equality, from which as often as
not the demands of justice may require us to depart.
Because Western societies have come to enjoy a consensus that
there are certain "goods" to which all humans are equally entitled,
it may be argued that equality remains a clear precept of justice
even after all human beings physically present have been admitted
to membership. It may be said, for instance, that it is equality which
entitles all persons in our welfare states to minimum material re-
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sources of food, shelter, and medical care. We may accept that such
a precept of justice exists now; but it is far from self-evident that
this must be derived from the principle of equality. The precept
that people are entitled to certain material minima can rest just as
soundly on the biological needs of human beings as on a philosoph-
ical concept like equality.
More ambitious arguments are made that equality is also the
necessary basis for prescribing minimum educational, intellectual and
political opportunities which are essential supports for the rights of
free formation and expression of demands and opinions. These en-
titlements, too, can rest on membership in a democratic society dedi-
cated to the maximum satisfaction of human demands within a power
structure responsible to the community in general. The nature of
such a polity demands these opportunities for its members.
Even if the material resources of a society are inadequate to
meet the biological subsistence needs of all its members, these an-
swers hold. If only ten percent of what is needed is available,
equality affords no persuasive reason for condemning all members
to death by imposing a rule of equal sharing rather than drawing
lots to ascertain which ten percent of the population will survive.
Arguable alternatives include allowing the youngest ten percent to
survive, allowing the most talented ten percent to survive, or allow-
ing the ten percent to survive comprising the youngest children and
a sufficient number of related adults required to look after them.
The principle of equality is in no way decisive among these or other
conceivable alternatives.
V. The Equal Protection Clause
The contemporary use of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
a fascinating practical illustration of the problems discussed above.
This clause has been used as a vehicle for doing justice to minorities,
especially as between blacks and whites. Its use reveals that the
presumption of equality cannot be a decisive criterion of justice even
when it is given overriding constiutional validity. Like the first
amendment's provision for free speech, the equal protection clause
is absolute on its face. However, it has been subjected to excep-
tions such as a compelling state interest. The present paper will not
address itself to the different levels of scrutiny to which courts sub-
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ject state inroads into the equal protection of its citizens. It is con-
cerned only with the limited guidance afforded by the equality no-
tion, as such, in application of the equal protection clause, once the
gross problem of the exclusion from the community of some human
beings, for instance the slaves in the old South, is out of the picture.
Although the equal protection clause was first interpreted as
prescribing that the same rule must be applied to all, this meaning
has obviously not been left unqualified. The clause also came to be
used to mean that members of the society can, and indeed should,
in appropriate cases, be protected by laws which differentiate among
them according to preexisting factual equalities, in order to bring
about a resultant (or residual) greater equality. 17
These conflicting meanings are but one set of the equivocal
meanings which beset the notion that equality equals justice, but
they are important because they underlie some of the massive contro-
versies initiated two decades ago by Brown v. Board of Education.,,
The conflict has now approached a point of climax because the de-
segregation decisions and civil rights laws are being jostled by the
conflict between demands for affirmative action and claims of re-
verse, or benign, discrimination. That this conflict is intensifying
is no coincidence. When the status quo, against which the equality-
as-justice demand inveighs, manifests gross exclusions of some classes
of humans from the community, equality seems to speak with one
voice. This is so because what it speaks to is not strictly the ques-
tion of a just distribution but rather the question, preliminary to this,
of delimiting the human constituency within which a just distribu-
tion is to be made. Once the grossest exclusions and oppressions
have been removed, however, equality ceases to be univocal. Its
directives for setting the bounds of what is each person's due are
then rarely clear. 19
This analysis is the best way to understand the debates now sur-
rounding DeFunis, Bakke, and the New York reapportionment cases.2 0
American courts, with the justification of supposed constrictions of
17. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
18. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. It could be said that what is to be perceived as a "gross" exclusion or subjec-
tion is itself not as clear as assumed above, as when, with Aristotle, even enslavement
was not seen as such. I would agree that the perception is culturally conditioned, but
deny that this admission affects the gist of the argument in the text.
20. See cases cited at note 43 infra.
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their constitutional mandate, and the theorists, with no such justifi-
cation, have continued to look to equality as a rational and sufficient
basis for decisions. But when the equivocal nature of the concept
is seen, they look also to some new modality or qualification of the
same equality notion for help. Thus, the principle arises that com-
pensating for past harmful discrimination, by current discrimination
favoring the victim class, legitimizes the use of race as an explicit
classification even though racial classifications are inherently sus-
pect. 21  Likewise, the "fundamental" nature of a right is held to
require, as in the case of an accused's right to fair trial, a discrimin-
atory law providing some, but not all, defendants free services. 22
These efforts to set standards of tolerable justice by manipulating
the concept of equality produce a deepening morass of unprincipled
decision-making. Substantive due process in its time was used for
setting such standards of protection for property rights. In that con-
text it remains dead by repute. We have done little better, so far
as coherence goes, in using the equality notion as a device for a
similar purpose, except for glimmers of light from the distinctions
between abstract and concrete equality, or between equality as mean-
ing subjection to the same uniform rule and equality as requiring
discrimination in favor of the less fortunate in search of a greater
residual equality.
VI. The Reverse Discrimination Problem
Ronald Dworkin's2 3 justification of reverse discrimination in cases
like DeFunis24 and Bakke 25 illustrates well what may be called the
21. See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 57-60, 553 P.2d
1152, 1168-69, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 696-97 (1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 46
U.S.L.W. 4896 (1978).
22. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring free trial transcripts for
use by indigent defendants on direct appellate review); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963) (requiring free counsel for indigents for the first appeal).
23. Dworkin, The DeFunis Case: The Right to Go to Law School, N.Y. REVIEW
OF BooKs, Feb. 5, 1976, at 29, reprinted in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 224 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Dworkin]. The use of Mr. Dworkin's justification of reverse dis-
crimination to illustrate what I have ventured to call the slough of equality is meant
in no invidious sense. His efforts to marshall learning to contemporary issues and the
coverage and imagination which have often accompanied this have drawn general ad-
miration. His work has been chosen precisely because of this admiration and because
he offered a rationale of precisely this area.
24. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
25. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976), aff'd in part, re'd in part, 46 U.S.L.W. 4896 (1978). See Dworkin,
Why Bakke Has No Case, N.Y. REVIEW OF BooKs, Nov. 1977, at 11.
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slough of equality. Mr. Dworkin correctly identifies the central puz-
zle in this area as that of why the exclusion of a black from the Uni-
versity of Texas on the ground of race in Sweatt v. Painter26 violates
the equal protection clause and the exclusion of the white applicant
DeFunis from the University of Washington does not. DeFunis was
excluded under a law school admissions program which admitted
minority applicants to fill its quota even if they fell short of general
admission standards and even if they displaced white candidates who
more than met the standards. The recent United States Supreme
Court ruling in Bakke, while holding that race is permissible as one
of a basket of admission factors, appears to invalidate such quota
systems, at least in educational institutions.26a
Dworkin's justification for DeFunis' exclusion despite Sweatt's
required admission plunges directly into the first slough of equality,
that of equivocations or concealed multiple references regarding the
definition of equality. Critics of reverse discrimination, Dworkin
says, confuse two different rights guaranteed by the equal protection
clause. The first right is "the right to equal treatment," which is
the right to "an equal distribution of some opportunity or resource
or burden."27  The second is only "the right to treatment as an equal,"
which is the right to be treated with the same "respect" and "concern"
or "consideration" as anyone else,28 or "full" or "sympathetic" "re-
spect," "concern," or "consideration."29
Of these two different kinds of equality, says Dworkin, the right
to treatment as an equal is fundamental while the right to equal
treatment is derivative. Thus, the short distinction implied between
Sweatt and DeFunis is that in Sweatt the black was denied both
kinds of rights whereas DeFunis was denied only the derivative right
to equal treatment but accorded the fundamental right to treatment
as an equal. This distinction, of course, implies that the kind of
equality protected by the equal protection clause is the right to
treatment as an equal, and that the clause only forbids denial of
equal treatment when it is accompanied by denial of treatment as
an equal. This distinction begs the question of which of the possible
26. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
26a. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 46 U.S.L.W. 4896 (1978).
27. Dworkin, supra note 23, at 227.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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references of equal protection is the applicable one.30  Dworkin as-
serts, rather than demonstrates, that equal treatment is derived from
treatment as an equal rather than vice versa.31 One can say that the
right to an equal share includes the right to an equal share of respect
as easily as Dworkin says that to have an equal share of respect may,
but need not, include an equal share of whatever else is distributed.
What is more important, though, is that even if Dworkin's dis-
tinction is accepted, the distinction itself raises the question of how
helpful it is to frame issues of justice in terms of equality. As he
correctly observes, the equal protection clause "makes the concept
of equality a test of legislation, but it does not stipulate any particu-
lar conception of that concept."32  The very right to equal treatment
which he derives from the right to treatment as an equal has itself
two potentially contradictory meanings. Dworkin assumes that the
right to equal treatment means an equal distribution through uniform
application of a rule. However, equal treatment can and often does
mean, especially in the welfare state, treatment by a differentiating
rule which yields a greater residual equality between the subjects.
These contradictory meanings of "equal treatment" raise problems
enough, for they provide the minority-group applicant in DeFunis'
or Bakke's situation with an argument in his favor without invoking
Dworkin's vague competing right of treatment as an equal or equal
respect.
In Dworkin's view, though, treatment as an equal decisively
justifies failure to accord equal treatment. Can this concept really
be so decisive, or for that matter, even very helpful? Dworkin does
not define the concept beyond saying that it means equality of re-
30. See the much clearer statements of J.R. Lucas, who exposes in general the
unavoidable built-in contradictions, as well as overlappings, between these two mo-
dalities of "equality." Lucas, supra note 9, at 298.
31. Dworkin offers only a hypothetical case by way of demonstration. If two
children are suffering from a disease, one at death's door, the other merely uncomfort-
able, he says, "I do not show equal concern if I flip a coin to decide which should
have the remaining dose of the drug." Dworkin, supra note 23, at 227. One diffi-
culty with this is that it premises that we know the outcomes, and that the contrast
between them is so radical as to leave us no choice. And even this case might become
problematical if we thought the dying child was in any case past help, or that the
milder case was in danger of becoming threatening to life, or if the dying child was
in any case irreversibly paralyzed, and the other in otherwise normal health, or a child
genius like Mozart.
32. Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
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spect and concern or full respect and concern. These definitions are
almost as indefinite and vague as Rawls' concept of fairness. Nor
does his use of "equal" to modify "respect" have a quantitative ref-
erence associated with the notion of equality-as-justice. Dworkin's
argument to show that displacement of DeFunis by the minority
applicant manifested equal respect for DeFunis is, in fact, quite in-
dependent of the equality notion. What he says is that other tests
for admission might be as just as the test of intellectual merit, pro-
vided they are supported by prospects of plausible social benefits,
such as providing better legal services to the minority community.
What are here being compared are not any quantities of respect be-
tween the claimants. Rather the admission test of intellectual merit
is being compared with any "plausible social benefits" which can be
thought of - one value is being compared with an indeterminate
range of other imaginable values.
By these efforts to justify DeFunis' exclusion under the equal
protection clause, Dworkin has moved a startling distance away from
the concept of equality. His departure becomes extraordinary when
he attempts to explain why Sweatt's exclusion from the University
of Texas could not be properly based on the premise that admission
of blacks would dry up the flow of alumni funds to the school, or
why Jews could not be excluded from Harvard in order to ensure that
that University trained a more "balanced" national leadership. His
explanation amounts to the following: "many individuals" may be
put at a disadvantage, even if this disadvantage "involves racial or
other discrimination," because "it makes the community as a whole
better off."33
At this point, any influence of equality-as-justice on the matter
seems quite beyond the horizon. But the journey of justice beyond
equality is even then not ended. To justify his supposed "funda-
mental" principle of treatment as an equal, which will override the
"derivative" principle of equal treatment, he has brought us to a
general category of "justice" or of "ideal society."
At this point, in order to condemn Sweatt's exclusion while justi-
fying DeFunis', despite the plausible social benefits which might be
expected to flow from both, Dworkin feels that he must explicate
what he means by society's being better off.3 4
33. Id. at 231-32.
34. Id. at 232-38.
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He defines society's being better off in a utilitarian sense of that
which gives satisfaction to the aggregate of preferences in society.
He distinguishes between personal and external preferences. Per-
sonal preferences are those rooted in a person's self-interest in the
results of a decision flowing to him, as, for example, when someone
prefers segregation (or integration) because this improves his own
chances of success. "External preferences" are based not on a per-
son's self-interest but on his emotive and moral attitudes toward others,
as with a preference for segregation because of hatred for blacks, or
a preference for integration because of a love for blacks or a belief
in the Brotherhood of Man. Dworkin seems to argue that only per-
sonal preferences, and not external preferences, ought to be counted
in determining whether society is "better off" in the sense of receiving
maximum satisfaction of the aggregate of preferences. Hence, pre-
vention of drying up of alumni funds in Sweatt could not make society
better off because the alumni would only be satisfying their external
preferences, contempt for blacks. They would not be satisfying their
personal preferences for self-regarding success.
This analysis appears to make a real distinction between Sweatt
and DeFunis, but this point is still not the end. Dworkin warns that
this apparent distinction is not really a workable one because an
individual's external preferences may become grafted onto and re-
inforce his personal preferences. Similarly, a person's external pref-
erence or attitude is often the basis on which personal preferences are
sincerely conceived. This practical unseverability of the two kinds
of preferences leads Dworkin to question whether a utilitarian sense
of social betterment leads to any conclusion at all.35
Dworkin's end conclusion seems to be that departure from equal
treatment under the equal protection clause is justified by further-
ance of an ideal which will in turn make society better off.36 Because
the utilitarian test of social betterment fails to elucidate the problem,
Dworkin is left with a constitutional argument on equality which is
based on values which he thinks should prevail but which have no
necessary relation to the idea that equality is justice. This is the point
to which his argument that DeFunis and Bakke who were excluded
and the other applicants who were admitted were each treated as an
equal, finally brings him. Dworkin's further insistence that his thesis
35. Id. at 236-38.
36. Id. at 238-39.
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does not deny anyone's right himself to be treated as an equal seems
a non sequitur.
Instead of this vain struggle to return his discussion of justice
to the morass of equality, Dworkin would have been more helpful
if he had explained the distinction between the ideals of society which
he thinks can justify discrimination and its external preferences which
he thinks do not. Failure to distinguish these makes the remaining
mystery the deeper since Dworkin is insistent that this rejection of
external preferences applies even to people's altruistic and moral-
istic preferences, and not merely to their emotive prejudices in the
pejorative sense. When do socio-ethical beliefs qualify as ideals
(which can justify discrimination) and when do these beliefs remain
external preferences (which cannot)? Whatever Dworkin's answer
is, it cannot be centered on equality or any of its modalities. We
may well accord a degree of charity to American courts struggling
desperately, at great intellectual cost, to state every decision under
the equal protection clause in terms of equality, since they feel
themselves constitutionally held in the vice of that clause. Scholarly
inquiry cannot, however, offer such excuses for pretending that a
decision can be justified by appeal to equality, especially when its
own analysis shows that it cannot.
VII. The Generalized Equal Protection Problem
The preceding section shows the spurious role that the presump-
tion of equality plays in support of reverse discrimination. The same
point can be made more generally about all decisionmaking under the
equal protection clause.
In a notable analysis of this body of decisions, 37 John Bishop
observed that in the face of the prevalence and severity of inequalities
among members of society, the choices which have to be made under
the equal protection clause are not between treating people equally
and unequally but between justified unequal treatment and unjusti-
fied unequal treatment.38 Whenever unequal treatment is held justi-
fied, the constitutional protection of equality receives new modalities.
37. J. Bishop, Justice as Equality in the New Equal Protection (1974) (Mimeo.
paper, A.S.L.P./60a, of the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy).
38. He does not confront (naturally enough, in the context of the equal protec-
tion (clause) the important consequential question discussed in Section III, whether the
incidence of justice-relevant inequalities-where equality must yield to other values-
is so predominant that "the presumption of equality" should be abandoned or even
reversed. .
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The focus of the equal protection clause is limited to infringe-
ments arising from state action, but the underlying theory of equality-
as-justice is relevant to ethical evaluation of all interpersonal action.
The more complex, wide-ranging and refined a legal order, the more
it will proliferate masses of rules which distribute benefits and bur-
dens among social members. These rules will distribute scarce re-
sources among the members of society based on the facts stated in
each rule. The set of facts on which each rule is predicated will
be different from the facts of all different rules precisely because they
are different rules.3  All of these different sets of predicated facts
involve differential legal distributions corresponding to differences in
persons, differences in issues, or both. State action involving such
differentiations is subject to judicial evaluation under the equal pro-
tection clause. The corresponding evaluation in terms of justice is
not so limited. In both spheres, the narrower and the wider, it is
clear that the prescribed equality does not necessarily mean govern-
ance of all by the same rule, for such a meaning might strike down
the bulk of rules of every legal system of any complexity.
To detect objectionable departures from uniform rules, American
courts resort to various devices. One of these is the category of
"suspect classifications," of which some of the earliest were classifi-
cations by skin color or ancestry.40  Even these classifications were
not mechanically stricken down under the clause if it could be shown
that under "strict scrutiny" the classification was necessary to serve
some "compelling state interest."41  The Warren Court added to this
category requiring strict scrutiny those discriminating rules which,
although not containing suspect classifications, had the effect of im-
pairing the fundamental rights or interests of the person to whom
they applied.42
These judicial inventions transcend the notion of equating justice
with equality. The characterization of a classification as suspect must
39. Of course, there may be overlappings between rules-sometimes so great as
to create a distinction without any difference, or meaningless category. This pertains
to the imperfections of the rules.
40. The specific prohibition of bills of pains and penalties figured, of course, ex-
plicitly and separately in the constitutional amendments from the beginning.
41. The so-called newer equal protection standards of judicial review were elabo-
rated in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (dissenting opinion by Harlan, J.),
and was adopted by a majority of the court in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
42. Id.
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spring from some value other than equality. That another value is
the source is even clearer when rights or interests are characterized
as fundamental. Thus, the problems now debated in relation to the
so-called "new equal protection," 43 into which the Bakke ruling will
have to be fitted, may not be newer.
It was Justice Harlan, who, dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson,4
refused to ratify the principle of equal but separate as satisfying equal
protection and who formulated the oft-quoted aphorism that "our
Constitution is color blind." It was the Justice Harlan of a much
later generation who protested in his dissent in Griffin v. Illinois45
that the majority holding under the equal protection clause produced
the anomalous result that a constitutional admonition to treat all
persons equally meant in that case that the State must provide free
of cost to one class of persons that for which all others were required
to pay. This result might still be explained in terms of equality, if
the equivocation of equality chosen is that one which yields a greater
residual equality between subjects after application of the rule, rather
than that which requires only uniform application of the same rule.
Later cases indicate that more than a choice between two con-
flicting versions of equality is involved in the affirmative action re-
quirement. The decisive final issue is not really apt for disposition
in terms of equal protection of the laws; its meaning is more precisely
sought in terms of minimal acceptable standards of justice, or the
avoidance of unacceptable arbitrariness and unreasonableness. In
short, the conflict between those two notions of equality points to the
need for some kind of revived doctrine of substantive due process.
The problem with reviving this doctrine is, of course, that substantive
due process is thought to be dead, even if not yet buried.46 When
43. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 352
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), aff'd in part, re'd in part,
46 U.S.L.W. 4896 (1978).
44. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
45. 351 U.S. 12, 34 (1956).
46. The U.S. Supreme Court has not struck down a single economic regulation as
violative of substantive due process since Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S.
55 (1937), in contrast to the three decades preceding the landmark case of Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), during which numerous such regulations were stricken.
Substantive due process has been decried by members of the present court, although
the due process clause of the fifth amendment has been a tool used in expanding per-
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the majority in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections4, suggested that
a poll tax of $1.50 would violate the equal protection not only of those
unable to pay it but also of those unwilling to pay it, they could not
explain their decision even under the modality of "residual" equality.
In any case, when affirmative action decisions are ostensibly
drawn from the concept of equality, it is other policies or values which
actually underly the judgment. In Shapiro v. Thompson4 8 the ma-
jority held that a one-year state residency requirement for entitle-
ment to public assistance violated equal protection. The court was
choosing, in reality, Harlan's dissent points out, between the value
of fulfilling subsistence needs for all persons and the value of reward-
ing persons settling in the state on the basis of the merit, (in the eyes
of the state concerned), of continuing residence in that state.
This shift, from decisionmaking based on justice identified with
equality to decisionmaking according to justice tout court, is also
manifest in the court's fixing upon impairment of fundamental rights
or interests as grounds for requiring strict scrutiny. The constitu-
tional precept of equality, after all, is in no way limited to fundamental
rights and interests, so that classification of rights and interests as
fundamental or not is no more than a peg on which the Court hangs
its straight judgment of whether legal support of a particular kind of
claim violates in some respect the tolerable minima of justice. Behind
the equal protection complexities of Serrano v. Priest49 is a judgment
that there is a proper place for concern for the education among these
tolerable minima. Moreover, the range of rights and interests labeled
fundamental is more varied, and certainly more capricious, than the
range of suspect classifications. The puzzles of equal protection be-
come even more perplexing when the judgment depends on the inter-
action between the degree of "suspectness" and the degree of "funda-
mentalness."
VIII. Conclusion
This Article has delineated some of the difficulties caused by an
excessive stress on equality as a central concern of justice, even when
sonal rights in the last decade. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(majority opinion by Brennan, J.).
47. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
48. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
49. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). Contra, San Antonio
Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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that stress is embodied in a positive constitutional text like the equal
protection clause. It has also observed the treacherous equivocations
of the notion of equality. The resulting dangers to clear thought and
rational practice should be brought coherently to mind.
When the presumption of equality goes unrebutted, it becomes
the rule of justice regardless of whether the burden of proof should
have been so placed. Moreover, just as presumptions underlying the
rules of burden of proof of facts do not guarantee that the truth will
emerge, neither does the presumption of equality guarantee that jus-
tice will emerge. Even when the presumption is successfully rebutted
by a showing of empirical differences relevant to justice, the concept
of equality fails a fortiori to guide us to a rule of justice. A criterion
different from equality must still be found which corresponds to the
justice-relevant empirical differences rebutting the presumption.
The unclear guidance and questionable outcomes resulting from
indulgence in the presumption of equality are not its only dangers.
Even greater dangers arise from the method of thought encouraged
by the presumption. It invites us constantly to take the easy course
of identifying justice with equality, and it diverts us from the real
difficulties of doing justice in modem Western democracies. These
difficulties are to identify the empirical differences in badges of en-
titlement relevant to justice and to devise rules corresponding to
these differences.
Many are likely to disagree with these themes. They may argue
that the confused practice under the equal protection clause is not
persuasive. They could point out that these decisions would still be
ridden with subjectivity and confusion even if made overtly and
directly in terms of the minimum tolerable levels of justice, without
reference to equality. There are at least two reasons to reject this
argument. First, most people, lawyers and laymen alike, recognize
that if a rule is declared just or unjust, that conclusion must be sup-
ported by persuasive reasons for approving what is asserted as just or
disapproving what is unjust. This psychological fact drives towards
recognition and articulation of the values that are in conflict, and of
the reasons why some values may have to be cut short, so that others
may have more fulfilment. Such recognition and articulation are
vital to the steady reasoned elaboration of justice after which all
thoughtful members of a democratic society hanker. Attempts to
state all judgments of justice in terms of equality tend to foreclose,
truncate or conceal the range of values and interests involved, thus
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impeding the path to more adequate theory and practice. No degree
of sincerity of the appeal to equality reduces these impediments.
And the equivocations surrounding the equality notion - the fact
that it is an illusory category of multiple reference - builds the
impediments higher.50
My second reason is perhaps even weightier. The discussion
in section III shows that the presumption of equality, in the sense
commonly indulged, cannot be sustained a priori as a starting point
for justice-argument, whether as a constitutive principle, as an infer-
ence from the fact of common humanness, or as an inference from
the logical structure of a rule. The presumption offers no coherent
guide even for determinations under the equal protection clause,
at least in part because that clause does not say which of the available
versions of the notion of equality is intended.
In these circumstances, to continue to seek for just solutions to
the great problems of the last quarter-century by these desperate
journeyings through the slough of equality is an intimidating prospect.
By such a course (as has been sufficiently shown) we are constantly
confused, frustrated or misled. Not only will this course not meet
the problems, it may well loosen our grasp even on such precious
terrains of justice as are already firmly held, here and there, in many
of our societies. John Bishop51 and Gerald Gunther52 have pointed
out that the failure of the United States Supreme Court to articulate
adequate reasons for equal protection rulings has left the remarkably
beneficent legacy of the Warren Court, concerning values of per-
sonality, in a fragile and vulnerable situation. But what these writers
fear for the limited context of cases arising under the equal protection
clause should also be feared for justice across the whole range of
decisionmaking on the legislative, administrative, and judicial levels.
50. See J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYER'S REASONINGS 246-48 (1964); text
accompanying notes 15-16 supra. Compare, of course in less explicit terms, Bishop's
stated preference for a due process basis of the decisions as to "fundamental" rights
and interests. See Bishop, supra note 37, at 21. See also the discussion of Harper
v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), id. at 29. As to the incon-
clusiveness of the language of the equal protection clause to deal with the justice de-
terminations required of the Court, see id. at 30.
51. J. Bishop, Justice as Equality in the New Equal Protection (1974) (mimeo.
paper, A.S.L.P./604, of the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy).
52. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1972).
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Of course, the justice notion imposes itself on people within the
context of their societies and generations only in the form of com-
peting criteria which are constantly changing. This Article does not
canvass these criteria nor does it press for the acceptance of any in
particular. Yet the unprecedented changefulness of contemporary
societies, and the related movements and conflicts of values in our
time must extend and intensify rather than reduce our attention to
justice. In particular, we should not deceive ourselves into believing
that we can, by stumbling uncritically into the mirages surrounding
the slough of equality, escape the need to continue to review, revise
and work with the ideas of justice which we have inherited. To try
to reduce justice to the equality principle, or some still to be found
modality of it, seems in Holmes' trenchant metaphor, to be "churning
the void in the hope of making cheese."-5
A Postscript on Bakke in the Supreme Court of the United States
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke 54 rings clear in support of the pres-
ent thesis. Even in applying the constitutional precept of the equal
protection clause, we find, at the critical watersheds of judgment, that
it is not equality but some wider notion such as "justice," or a society
that is "not race conscious," or "not oppressive" which is decisive.
The five judges who joined in the majority holding that the Supreme
Court of California55 erred in prohibiting the University "from estab-
lishing race-conscious programs in the future," consisted of Mr. Jus-
tice Powell, and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, in
a joint opinion concurring on this issue. We may refer to these latter
four judges as "the Brennan Four."56
53. Letter from O.W. Holmes, Jr., to H.J. Laski (Aug. 11, 1921) on his third
reading of Bergson's Creative Evolution, 1 HOLMEs-LAsKi LETTERs 357 (M. Howe ed.
1953).
54. 46 U.S.L.W. 4896 (1978). This postscript, of course, is not directed to the
main constitutional issues, which require a separate article.
55. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152
(1976).
56. The remaining four justices (Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Renquist) disposed
of the case on the basis of provisions of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
other than its nondiscrimination provision-namely its categorical prohibition of "ex-
clusion." 46 U.S.L.W. at 4934-36. This removes any bearing of their opinion on the
above issue on which the five majority judges were agreed that secton 601 "goes no
further in prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 4911.
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How did these five judges draw from the equal protection clause
the view that the use of race as a criterion is not prohibited where the
discrimination is remedial of the disadvantages resulting from past
unlawful discrimination against the group? Since their respective
tolerances of race-conscious criteria have very different ambits, I will
consider Mr. Justice Powell's views, and those of the Brennan Four
separately.
For Mr. Justice Powell the decisive point was that the benign-
discriminatory provision must be shown to be necessary for protecting
a substantial and constitutionally permissible purpose or interest of
the State.5 7  Since what was to be justified in Bakke was the depar-
ture from equality involved in benign discrimination, it is obvious that
the justifying "purpose" or "interest" invoked by the Justice cannot
be the attainment of equality in that same sense; for then no question
of its "constitutional permissibility" would arise. At nearest, it might
be the approximation to that condition-that is, in the Davis Medical
School, to a percentage of minority entrants proportionate to that of
the minorities in the general population. But this is precisely the pur-
pose which Powell denied 58 can ever be permissible under either
Title VI or the equal protection clause. The other purposes of the
University of California in Bakke which (other requirements being
met) Mr. Justice Powell would regard as permissible were: (1) to
ameliorate "the disabling effects of identified discrimination"; 59 (2)
to improve delivery of minority health services;60 (3) to diversify the
student body so as to produce a robust exchange of ideas, "speculation,
experiment and creation."6 1 Though some indirect relation to equal-
ity may possibly be found in the first of these other purposes, the
values they represent can clearly not be expressed or contained in any
norm of equality. So that for Mr. Justice Powell some value other
than equality was finally decisive.
At first sight, the same is to be said as to the Brennan Four's as-
sertion that "[o]ur cases have always implied that an 'overriding stat-
utory purpose' . . . could be found that would justify racial classifi-
57. Id. at 4906 (citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1973)).
58. Id. at 4906.
59. Id. at 4906.
60. Id. at 4907.
61. Id. at 4907-08 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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cations."6 2  This "overriding purpose" seems to refer to values other
than equality; otherwise how could it be said to "override" the equality
prescribed by the equal protection clause.
Yet, on further analysis, the matter is more obscure. The Bren-
nan Four (disagreeing in this respect with Mr. Justice Powell) held
that even the fixing of numerical quotas proportionate to population
was a permissible remedial measure against the effect of past discri-
mination.6 3  On this basis "the overriding purpose" could be said to
be the achievement of "equality," albeit in a sense of equality different
from that in title of which Bakke claimed that the remedial measures
violated his claim to it, or which Mr. Justice Blackmun called "ideal-
istic equality." Even this in-some-sense-equal-seeking purpose can-
not, however, rehabilitate equality as the decisive value in play. By
hypothesis, race-conscious criteria in remedial, discriminatory prefer-
ences impair the quality of the nonpreferred (in this case, Bakke), so
that the confrontation is between two vindications of "equality."
Equality, being on both sides of the argument, cannot decide it as
long as its meaning does not shift-as indeed it here does-from equal-
ity in the sense of application of a uniform legal rule, to equality in
the sense of application of discriminating legal rules which, precisely
by their discriminations, increase the resultant factual equality.6 4
Even if the only critical point is whether one meaning of equality
shall override the other, careful analysis must conclude that this point
itself cannot be decided without reference to a value other than
equality.
The majority positions, therefore, on the main issue in Bakke, still
support the present thesis as to the nondecisiveness of the equality no-
tion in current rulings under the equal protection clause, even when
the remedy approved is by allocation of discriminating numerical
quotas to redress underrepresentation of a particular race. But, of
course, the Brennan Four would admit, under the tests they adopt,
other "important governmeint objectives" (including presumably those
mentioned above as approved by Mr. Justice Powell) as legitimating
the discriminations involved in benign discrimination or affirmative
action.6 5
62. Id. at 4919 (citing a string of cases ending with McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S.
39 (1971) and North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971),
supporting race-conscious desegregation plans in schools).
63. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4921, 4924 & n.58; Id. at 4932 (Blackmun, J.).
64. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
65. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4920.
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For the Brennan Four as for Mr. Justice Powell, therefore, it re-
mains true that beyond the simplest cases of grossly arbitrary exclu-
sion of individuals from the justice constituency, the values preferred
by the judges, even in applying the constitutional norm of equal pro-
tection, are not contained within the notion of equality. Beyond
those simplest cases, decisions require, if they are to be intellectually
comprehended, to be referred to some wider value norm or norms of
what is due between members of society. If we are unhappy with
the term "justice," which is a millenial symbol for such a wider norm,
can we be much happier with the judicial reliance on "important
governmental objectives? '"6
Mr. Justice Blackmun's sensitively eloquent separate opinion al-
most expresses the present thesis, and certainly well illustrates it. He
pointed out that "governmental preference has not been a stranger
to our legal life," instancing veterans, handicapped persons, and In-
dians, even aside from the ad hoc constitutionally-protected progres-
sive income tax.67  Further, "in order to treat some persons equally,
we must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare not-let the
Equal Protection Clause perpetrate racial supremacy."s The infer-
ence is permissible that in his view equality is no more the final value-
criterion which legitimates preference for those suffering from the
effects of past racial discrimination, than it is what legitimates prefer-
ence for veterans, or handicapped persons, or Indians. With great
respect, I profoundly agree.
66. Id. at 4920 (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316 (1977)).
67. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4932.
68. Id. at 4933.
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